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ARE EXPERT WITNESSES WHORES? 
REFLECTIONS ON OBJECTIVITY IN SCHOLARSHIP AND EXPERT WITNESSING 
Abstract 
Some have derided the claim that historians or others who serve 
as expert witnesses or otherwise engage in advocacy live up to the 
usual standards of scholarly objectivity. A comparison of the modes of 
scholarly and advocacy production, based on my experience as an expert 
witness in six minority voting rights cases, however, suggests that the 
two modes are not very different, and that there are no compelling 
reasons to expect different outputs from them. The scholarly process 
is less pure and the adversary system provides more safeguards in this 
example than many suppose. Selling one's soul is both inefficient and 
dangerous. The comparison, however, has adverse implications for Lee 
Benson's recent proposal for the establishment of a formally associated 
group of social scientists, which would be unlikely, in my view, 
either to "change social science" in a desirable direction or to 
"change the world." 
ARE EXPERT WITilESSES WHORES? 
REFLECTIONS ON OBJECTIVITY IN SCHOLARSHIP AND EXPERT WITNESSING 
(Paper prepared for the Association of American Law Schools Convention, 
Cincinnati, Jan. 7, 1983) 
Expert witnesses' general reputation for veracity is not 
untainted. In the elegant and tasteful expression of Harold Green, 
director of the Law, Science, and Technology program at George 
Washington University, "Expert witnesses are whores. II Others 
interviewed for a newspaper article on science and public policy, in 
which Green's statement appears, were somewhat more charitable in their 
diction, but affirmed that expert witnesses were " ••• chosen not for 
their wisdom or sagacity but for their willingness to say in the 
simplest, clearest, least tentative way what a particular side wants 
said."1 
On the other hand, some scholars who have served as experts--
who are not, perhaps, entirely unbiased witnesses on the topic--claim 
to have retained their virtue. James Rosse, a Stanford economist who 
was reportedly paid $240,000 by AT&T in 1981 to perform studies in 
support of that corporation's position in its antitrust case, contended 
that "The legal process would tear to shreds any person who altered his 
views for a trial," and asserted that he informed the company that 
"there are things I will not testify to." Dean Henry Rossovsky of 
Harvard, an economist who testified for IBM during its antitrust case, 
insisted that scholars who do this type of consulting have a strong 
incentive not to distort their views or to dissimulate, because they 
must protect their professional reputations. "They don't have any 
other assets of significance," Rossovsky told a New York Times 
reporter. "If you get the reputation of being a hired gun, it won't 
help you."2 
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The question of the possible tensions between advocacy and 
objectivity presents somewhat different facets to the three groups most 
directly concerned with expert witnessing: scholars, lawyers, and 
judges. Responding to historian Lee Benson's 1977 Social Science 
History Association presidential address, which had the provocative 
title "Changing Social Science to Change the World", political 
scientist Warren Miller distinguished between pure and applied science 
and commented that "The motivation to do good--or bad--is simply 
different from the motivation to find out how things work, and it is 
the transformation of the latter motivation into action that is 
science."3 For historians, more particularly, the crux of the problem 
is not the old epistemological chestnut, "Can the study of history be 
objective?" but a simpler and less absolute, if longer one, "Assuming 
that it makes sense to say that some analyses are more objective than 
others, are historians who serve as expert witnesses likely to be less 
objective, either because of their own committments or because of some 
aspects of the legal process, than other historians are, or than the 
witnesses themselves are when they are doing their normal scholarship?" 
Lawyers see the topic from a different vantage point. If my 
experience with them is at all representative, attorneys tend to 
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believe that their own experts are pure, even to the point of being too 
prissy to agree to state their own conclusions in a way which would be 
most helpful to the lawyers' clients--while the other side's are merely 
lying for money. Should lawyers treat expert witnesses--for either 
side or both--as analogues to celebrity endorsers of products? Is Dr. 
K's analysis of the reasons for the adoption of the Mobile city 
government act in the 1870s worthy of more deference than Dr. J's 
endorsement of a basketball sneaker? 
Judges, whose distorted "law office" versions of history written 
to serve their own points of view reverberate from Dred Scott through 
Wesberry v. Sanders, the Georgia legislative reapportionment case, to 
Mobile v. Bolden, may see the problem of experts' objectivity in yet 
another guise.4 Have expert witnesses, to paraphrase Chief Justice 
Taney's famous phrase in Dred Scott, any opinions that judges are bound 
to respect? Is a credentialed historian's or other social scientist's 
view entitled to any more weight than that of a man on the street, a 
random law clerk, or the judge's own "common sense"? (In two of the 
cases in which I've been involved, not, let it be noted, ones in which 
the side which I was testifying for won, the judges' answers, as 
implied by their opinions, have been "Yes, if the witnesses agree with 
my preconceived, seat-of-the-pants opinion; otherwise, no.") 
My own experience as an expert witness in six voting rights cases 
causes me to doubt the soundness of Warren Miller's observation, quoted 
above, as well as of Lee Benson's argument that if social science is to 
change the world, is to serve a humane purpose, it must itself first be 
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reformed and that a new institutional arrangement, a working group of 
historians and others, banded together to do research in support of 
progressive causes, supported financially by liberal foundations or 
labor unions, is a desirable and even necessary part of the reform of 
social science.s Perhaps I am blinded by good intentions or the heat of 
battle, but it seems to be that cases from Birmingham, Mobile, Selma, 
Brownsville, Tennessee, and Sumter, South Carolina, as well as an 
appearance before a House Judiciary Subcommittee hearing on renewing the 
Voting Rights Act, afforded me opportunities to tell the truth and do 
good at the same time. Moreover, I believe that changing the structure 
and methods of social science in the way Benson suggested at the 1981 
Organization of American Historians convention would neither advance 
social science nor further public policy causes that both Benson and I 
would agree are good ones. 
Before discussing the more general question, let me explain how I 
got involved in testifying. Since, as a historian, I have an 
occupational susceptibility to genetic explanations, my story will 
require a detour into the history of civil rights law. 
It may not be straining words too much to assert that the 
Fifteenth Amendment contains an explicit reference to intent. The 
right to vote, it declares, sha 11 not be "denied or abridged on account 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."(emphasis added) 
One reading of the phrase is that any law or practice adopted with a 
racially discriminatory intent ("on account of race") is by that fact 
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alone unconstitutional. Despite the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment 
contains no language which even this clearly refers to intent, the 
courts have read an intent criterion into it. In fact, they have, 
intermingled the standards of proof and lines of cases under each of 
the two amendments, which would no doubt be confusing enough if 
separated, to such a degree that the whole area of the law has become 
covered with a sort of constitutional kudzu, a mass of pullulating, 
ever more tangled, parasitic vines which have long since grown over and 
hidden the original constitutional saplings. 
Thus, in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896, the Supreme Court was content 
to assume that racially separate railroad cars were in fact equally 
comfortable and convenient, while it concentrated on denying that 
whites who imposed segregation intended it to be racially 
discriminatory. In Williams v. Mississippi in 1898, the Court admitted 
that the framers of the 1890 Mississippi Constitution intended to deny 
blacks the right to vote, but held that since the plaintiff had not 
shown that their intent was carried out, he had not proved a 
constitutional violation. The next year, in Cumming v. Richmond 
County, the justices shunted aside the obvious fact that the Augusta, 
Georgia school board discriminated when it provided two public high 
schools for whites, but closed the only one it had run for blacks, and 
focused on what Justice John Marshall Harlan took to be the crucial 
question--whether the school board had behaved "reasonably," or, in 
other words, without an intent to discriminate. Presented with 
evidence of both intent and effect in Giles v. Harris, a 1903 voting 
case, that great liberal Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes threw up his 
hands and declared disfranchisement a "political question."6 
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More recent courts have hacked no clearer path through the 
judicial thicket of intent and effect. In Brown v. Board, the Supreme 
Court appears to have assumed that if the NAACP's lawyers and expert 
witnesses could show that segregation had bad effects on black 
children, then they need not prove that school officials acted 
intentionally to bring about those consequences, but only that they had 
meant to segregate the schools, which of course all admitted. Where 
segregation was not formally established, however, the focus shifted to 
the school board's actions, such moves as gerrymandering attendance 
zones and siting new schools only in safely segregated areas being 
taken as evidence of the authorities' segregative intent. Segregation 
because of housing patterns (patterns which were no doubt partly 
produced by the actions of other governmental agencies, if not by the 
school boards), may have been indistinguishable in its effects from so-
called de jure segregation, but since it was allegedly not intended, it 
was ruled constitutional, for example, in the Detroit school case, 
Milliken v. Bradley.7 
That there were close parallels between the school cases and those 
in the voting rights and other areas is hardly surprising. Tuskegee, 
Alabama gerrymandered its town boundaries so blatantly as to leave no 
question as to its racially discriminatory intent; therefore, the Court 
could finesse the issue.B In the initial reapportionment opinions, 
too, intent played little role, and attempts to achieve legislative 
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ends which would in other cases have induced judicial obsequiousness 
were blithely shunted aside in the drive for a population equality 
effect.9 Yet in the Indianapolis at-large voting case, Whitcomb v. 
Chavis, the Supreme Court ruled that evidence of a racially unequal 
impact, by itself, was not enough; whereas, a week later in the 
Jackson, Mississippi, municipal swimming pool closing case, Palmer v. 
Thompson, it concluded that an overwhelming case based on intent was 
insufficient .1° 
The lines between intent and effect crossed and re-crossed in what 
now seems to be the leading Supreme Court case on at-large voting in 
multi-member districts, White v. Regester. Since the Voting Rights Act 
and the 24th Amendment suspended literacy tests and poll taxes, at-
large elections have been perhaps the major device for abridging or 
"diluting" minority political power. In White, a 1973 case from 
Dallas, the Court held that, while there is no constitutional right to 
proportional representation and while at-large systems are not,~~. 
unconstitutional, they are illegal if they are combined with other 
electoral devices which reduce the chances of minorities to elect 
persons of their choice, and if they occur in areas with a history of 
racial discrimination which is currently manifested in racially 
discriminatory slating groups, racial bloc voting, and a lack of 
responsiveness by officials to minority desires, or at least some of 
these. Further, direct evidence that the system had been established 
or maintained for a racial purpose, if such evidence were available, 
would, insofar as one can be sure of any doctrinal consistency in this 
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area of the law, be held to be probative. In the leading Appeals Court 
decision, Zimmer v. McKeithen, the White indicia were restated and 
refined, while in a series of mid- to late-1970s Supreme Court cases 
not directly related to multi-member districts, the Court emphasized 
with increasing insistence that intent was central to all racial 
discrimination cases.11 
White and Zimmer made clear that expert testimony by historians 
might be useful to paint a general picture of the history of racism, in 
order, at the least, to educate judges or to remind them of social 
facts which they might otherwise prefer to forget.1 2 And such 
testimony might be determinative if the historian could produce 
credible circumstantial or direct evidence that the intent of the 
framers of laws passed some time ago, now under challenge, was 
discriminatory. But whereas civil rights lawyers seem to have been well 
connected to a network of sociologists and political scientists who did 
research on voting rights, neither they nor the social scientists knew 
many historians, and historians were almost wholly ignorant of the 
relevant developments in the law. I was "discovered," if that is the 
correct word, by a particularly assiduous Birmingham lawyer with a 
pronounced historical bent (who has since gone on to do graduate work 
in history as a sideline) who read my book, called and recruited me, 
and mentioned my name to others. Thus, by the fateful day of April 22, 
1980, I had been engaged as an expert witness in two cases, in one of which 
I was to serve mainly the "educational" purpose of recounting the 
history of racism in South Carolina politics, and in the other of which 
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my role was to show the discriminatory intent behind a particular provision 
of the 1901 Alabama Constitution. 
The event of April 22, 1980, which threw the civil rights forces 
into what turned out to be a productive tizzy and which made 
historians, temporarily at least, not only window-dressing but 
necessary participants in voting rights cases, was the Supreme Court's 
decision in Mobile v. Bolden.l3 Writing for a four-man plurality, 
Justice Potter Stewart, without explicitly overruling White v. 
Regester, reinterpreted its holding as requiring proof of 
discriminatory intent and denied that the so-called "Zimmer factors," 
which had been derived chiefly from White, added up to evidence of 
intent. To some observers, it appeared that the Court, or at least the 
prevailing opinion, was demanding production of a gun still smoking 
after fifty years or more; that is, that plaintiffs had to prove that 
legislators who passed laws, often as long as a half-century ago, were 
actuated by racially discriminatory motives. 14 If this interpretation 
stuck, the Justice Department, the NAACP-LDF, the MALDEF, the ACLU, and 
private attorneys for minority groups had little choice but to call in 
the historians. The facts of Reconstruction, Redemption, and the 
Progressive Era became as relevant in the courtroom as regression 
analyses of racial bloc voting had been since 1973. 
At the time the Supreme Court heard Bolden and a companion school 
board case from Mobile, Brown v. Board, the lawyers for neither side 
had done all their historical homework. They traced'the at-large 
systems back to 1911 and 1919, respectively, and stopped there. When 
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the Supreme Court remanded Bolden and Brown back to the federal 
district court, the Justice Department and the Mobile counsel who had 
handled the case for the NAACP-LDF, assisted by a historian located in 
Mobile, Peyton McCrary, discovered that the at-large features of the 
election systems dated not from the 'teens, after most blacks had been 
disfranchised in Alabama, but from the 1870s, when the threat of black 
political power was much more palpable.15 I was brought in principally 
to provide "full period coverage," as one would say in the history job 
market, since McCrary's scholarly research had been on the Civil War 
and Reconstruction, while my specialty is the post-Reconstruction and 
"Progressive" eras. 
Researching the cases felt familiar. I started with some 
general, but not unshakable beliefs about how the world works and how 
historians should seek to explain things, a hypothesis to test, and 
some prior knowledge of election laws and of the place and period. 
After culling through the evidence, I tried to organize it to bring it 
to bear on the question of why the Alabama legislature passed a law 
providing for at-large elections for Mobile in a certain year. It was 
only in preparing for and going through cross-examination and watching 
others be cross-examined that the question of biases different from 
those encountered in more traditional scholarly pursuits arose. (How 
dare opposing counsel imply that I would shade the truth to make a 
point for the sake of money or ideology!) But once opened, the 
question of objectivity would not--will not--recede entirely from my 
consciousness. Somewhat different research experiences in three other 
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cases, in which I worked with and against different lawyers and before 
different judges expanded my experience, but did not change the nature 
of the questions or answers about objectivity. 
What does scholarly objectivity in history consist in, how do 
one's values enter into one's normal scholarship, and is the situation 
any different for one preparing to testify as an expert witness? 
First, it seems to me indubitable that values, tastes, talents, 
and circumstances guide one's initial choice of topic. What seems 
interesting to one person may bore another--! like tables and 
equations, and narrative puts me to sleep, but I recognize that other 
people's views differ, though I cannot account for their egregious 
preferences. As a southern white liberal and a life-long political 
junkie, if not always an activist, I naturally gravitated toward 
political history, more specifically Southern political history, and 
even more particularly the politics of race and class in the South. 
Others, with different burdens or penchants would consider such topics 
dull, but the history of sex or death or women fascinating. I find all 
three subjects absorbing--but not to read about. I have little talent 
for performing or systematically understanding music, and could 
therefore never write of it, but a former college roommate of mine 
dotes on scores and is, so far as I can gather, an excellent historian 
of opera. Much good history, too, is written by people caught up in 
special circumstances or surroundings. Local history examples too 
numerous to detail spring to mind, but other cases would include 
Trevor-Roper's work on Hitler's last days, occasioned by his 
participation in a British intelligence task force, and C. Vann 
Woodward's Battle for Leyte Gulf, a product of his wartime Washington 
navy job of consolidating and making sense of battle reports,l6 
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The prevailing research agenda determines other choices of topics. 
A subject closely related to a currently "hot" topic in a field may get 
a scholar a grant, and will nearly guarantee a longer vita, perhaps a 
prize, and maybe even tenure. Equally good work far from conventional 
interests will saddle one with a reputation (if any) as a person who 
may be "solid", but who works on dull or strange topics, or, if one is 
very lucky or insightful, eventual, possibly posthumous recognition as 
a "pioneer," Similarly, the whims of funding agencies are not entirely 
irrelevant to the activities of academics or at least to the packaging 
of those endeavors. It was no coincidence that when the Nixon 
Administration began pouring money into the National Cancer Institute, 
cancer research became a growth area in biology. As all these examples 
show, value-laden or self-interested reasons for choosing research 
topics are so omnipresent that it is difficult to imagine someone who 
could not be faulted for having a bias in choice of topics. Indeed, it 
is hard to understand what it would mean to say that someone had chosen 
his topic "objectively," As a consequence, any charge on this ground 
of a lack of objectivity for a historian doing legal casework must be 
nol prossed. 
A second consideration related to objectivity is in the 
assumptions a historian or any other social scientist makes and in the 
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ways in which he or she formulates the chief questions. Here, I must 
confess to bias. I am an unabashed Occamite--that is, I have a strong 
preference for parsimonious explanations; a confirmed believer in 
rational, maximizing behavior, especially by those calculating persons, 
politicians; and a person with very low Bayesian priors about 
unintended consequences. If I find blacks--or poor whites--shut out of 
politics, I immediately suspect that it didn't just happen to turn out 
that way, and I have faith that if I find the means employed and the 
wills involved in perpetrating the causal act or acts, the protagonists 
and their weapons in one geographical area will closely resemble those 
in other places, and the basic reasons for their activities will be 
simple. 
Yet in speaking of this as a "bias," I mean to use the word as a 
synonym for "predisposition" or "proclivity," rather than for 
unalterable presupposition. All scholars begin with some proclivities 
such as these, and nearly everyone alters his or her predispositions 
little by little as he or she accumulates more experience. Some, 
either as neophytes or at some stage in their lives before (or after) 
senility prefer complexity, assume irrationality, deny intent 
aprioristically. It is to be hoped, however, that both forest people 
and trees people, while they might be attracted to different facets of 
the scenery, would at least be able to agree roughly on what trail to 
follow through a particular wood. Less metaphorically, a modeler might 
admit the inadequacies of his schema in representing a certain 
situation, while a person of idiographic propensity might agree that 
uncomplicated explanations are sometimes correct. 
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In any event, differences in such assumptions equally color scholarly 
and contracted work. If mine are sins, they are ones I commit in 
monographs as well as in testimony. Yet since one inevitably must make 
some such leaps of faith, since one cannot escape these fundamental 
epistemological issues, even by ignoring them, making them cannot rob 
one of objectivity unless objectivity is never possible. The directed 
verdict on count two must therefore be acquittal. 
Third, did the process of examining evidence, which admittedly 
differs from that I would normally adopt, bias my conclusions, 
therefore robbing the project of objectivity? Generally, after 
deciding what to study, picking out, in a preliminary fashion at least, 
what principal questions to ask, and ransacking the secondary 
literature, I would go through as many primary documents as are 
available--newspapers, manuscripts (if any), official documents, voting 
returns--myself. This process reflects a professional tradition in 
history which stretches back time out of mind--or at least back to the 
establishment of the first American graduate programs a hundred years 
ago. The image of the lonely scholar, or perhaps, to modernize it a 
bit, of the lonely research team, seeking truth by applying their open, 
but careful minds to the appropriate evidence is pervasive among social 
scientists and humanists. Scholars may make mistakes, study 
uninteresting topics, fail to express themselves well, or even reflect 
unconsciously the popular worldview or disciplinary paradigm dominant 
at the time they're working, but they don't, in this standard 
stereotype, purposely distort. Truth is produced by what might be 
called a "linear" process. 
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In the adversary tradition, on the other hand, truth is assumed to 
emerge, if at all, as part of a dialectical process. The lawyer's 
ideal world is, in this respect, rather like Adam Smith's: when every 
lawyer seeks simultaneously to maximize the chances of his or her own 
client, assuming that each abides by some fundamental rules of 
fairness, an Invisible Hand guides the process toward the maximum 
production of truth. Lawyers are supposed to be advocates, are 
expected to represent their clients, have it drilled into them that 
they are not to pursue some abstract "truth" or "social good," but only 
the very relative interests of the people who hire their services. 
Graduate schools and law schools may often cohabit on the same campus, 
but in their self-conceptions, they have long since divorced. This 
separation breeds deep suspicion on each side of the other's 
pretentions and processes. 
Despite suspicions, I have had to accept the fact that in the 
cases I have worked on, others--the Justice Department, the LDF or 
other lawyers for the plaintiffs, and the lawyers and experts for the 
localities whose electoral systems are being challenged--perform most 
of the culling of primary sources. I read what they send me and what I 
specifically ask for. This would worry me more if the documents were 
secret or private, or if the lawyers with whom I've worked denied 
requests for papers or documents I asked them to look for, or if the 
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lawyers on each side didn't have a strong interest in confronting the 
court with all the evidence which could possibly buttress their 
positions. In fact, none of the material is private; and every request 
I've made for information--and I've been bothersome, in order to insure 
that I looked at everything I could think of which might be relevant 
has been complied with. Moreover, it appears to be in the nature of 
research for such litigation that the lawyers (exactly like scholars in 
this respect) don't know just how to put together the facts or which 
facts will turn out to be of relevance until very close to the last 
moment. They do the research when they can, drib and drab it out to 
prospective experts, put it all together the last night. Thus, time 
pressures and lack of complete foresight guard against their stacking 
any but the most obvious evidence. 
Only two things about the process really bother me. In the first 
place, even if the adversary process leads to truth, it's less likely 
to if the legal talent on each side is unequal. And I'm afraid that 
the acumen of counsel on the side of those charging discrimination has 
almost always been superior, in the cases I've been in, to that of the 
defenders of at-large voting. In other words, I can't be sure that the 
other side would recognize evidence for their cases if it jumped off 
the page at them. In the second place, despite the extensive discovery 
procedures which drag out modern litigation, there is a gaming tendency 
among lawyers which leads them to hold back evidence until cross-
examination. And there is a natural contrary tendency for a witness to 
stick to his guns when challenged, to consider cross-questioning a 
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combat, and therefore to disregard evidence offered at this time 
against his case. No one wants to look foolish or contradictory, or to 
conclude that he wasted his time. 
These doubts are connected with a fourth consideration, that of 
advocacy. Does the fact that one is making a case, is part of a team 
with a particular value-laden objective, by itself undermine the usual 
standards of scholarly objectivity? In all but one respect, I think it 
doesn't. After all, scholars do get committed to particular 
arguments--the Civil War was or was not irrepressible, the living 
standard of the working class in England rose or fell in the 
nineteenth-century, the American Revolution was primarily an 
intellectual or alternatively a social movement--and they rarely change 
their minds. (One might note, parenthetically, that the same state of 
affairs characterizes the physical sciences, for as Thomas Kuhn has 
pointed out, defenders of old paradigms rarely switch, they just 
retire.)17 Nonetheless, scholars sometime modify their stands, 
particularly on relatively minor points. They circulate papers and 
accept criticisms, alter some treatments in subsequent editions of 
books, at times even confess error. The trouble with a trial is that 
it's a one-shot affair, that one goes from expression to publication 
without circulation, copyediting, or galley proofs. Since one can 
hardly call up the judge six months later and say "I've changed my 
mind; I was wrong," the process of lengthy contemplation of one's 
interpretation, a usual part of scholarship, is necessarily private and 
naturally truncated for expert witnesses. 
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A fifth point follows closely in train. It is the core of the 
objectivity question. Did one pick only those pieces of evidence which 
fit his case, and did one twist his story to bypass evidence which 
could not be ignored? Here, the adversary process seems to me to 
provide a safeguard at least equal to those in academia. To most 
judges, the most credible expert witnesses are persons who have 
published fairly widely on the topic or on kindred ones. To most 
lawyers, who are risk-averse souls who prefer not to be surprised 
during trials, the best witnesses, other things equal, are experienced 
ones. Since books, articles, and previous testimony, affadavits, and 
depositions are matters of public record, an expert who takes 
contradictory positions on two similar pieces of evidence or similar 
positions on two contradictory pieces of evidence is placing his 
reputation at risk in a bet not only on the stupidity of opposing 
counsel in the instant case, but in every other case to come. 
Furthermore, it is somewhat easier, indeed, it is unavoidable in 
witnessing, to make one self-conscious of contrary cases. Even if the 
other side's barristers are inferior, at least in this rather 
specialized area of the law, one always overprepares for cross-
examination, and one is pressed in the moot court tradition by one's 
own side. No doubt lawyers might pull their punches to avoid unsettling 
their own witnesses, but that's a dangerous course, because the witness 
might sense duplicity or the contending lawyers might pull off lucky 
shots. Moreover, the witness, more frightened of a courtroom than the 
lawyers are, naturally tries to think of every possible question. The 
whole process, therefore, encourages the questioning and testing of 
interpretations much more than do normal scholarly procedures. 
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The sixth and final question breaks the analogy with regular 
scholarship, and rests on a counterfactual thought experiment. If I 
were testifying for the other side, would my conclusions differ? While 
I feel certain that, at least in the cases in which I have been 
involved, they would not--that is, that I would find evidence of an 
intent to discriminate in the passage or maintenance of the system; 
while I recognize that if my analysis did vary depending on whom I was 
working with, my days as a credible expert witness would be over; and 
while I half wish that some local government would retain me--they seem 
to pay better than the LDF or Legal Services or even Justice, and it 
would be satisfying to take their money and then upset their case--one 
aspect of the question still bothers me: assuming that if I did 
appear, I would speak truthfully and fully, would I testify for the 
other side? 
The difficulty is that an expert witness generally does more 
than testify. Unless he or she is brought in at the very last momemt 
or unless he or she is working with an extremely overbearing, absurdly 
self-confident lawyer, the witness usually has some role in organizing 
the case and especially in planning research on the facts. For if he 
does not understand the case, he cannot know what is relevant, and if 
he doesn't assist in and partly direct the gathering of the facts, he 
cannot be sure he has seen all the important evidence. Even if, as an 
"educational" witness, the expert is chiefly used to report on the 
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state of research in some academic field, he or she will have to know 
enough to know when to stop talking--a difficult thing for a professor 
in the best of circumstances--and he or she will probably be asked for 
advice on other aspects of the case, on other witnesses' reputations, 
on how to rebut their testimony, and so on. Expert witnesses do not 
merely give opinions; they join a company. 
Since, as a person, I believe strongly in racial equality, and 
since, as a social scientist, I find the empirical and theoretical 
evidence of the racially discriminatory impact of at-large systems 
overwhelming, could I work with lawyers who were attempting to preserve 
an at-large system in a jurisdiction which included a large and 
geographically separate minority group? (Other, analogous questions 
would occur to other potential expert witnesses or to me in other 
contexts.) Should the answer depend on the degree of oppression in 
each individual case, and how can that be gauged, especially before one 
knows much about the particular facts? Or should every situation be 
analogized to that of a chemical engineer in Nazi Germany being asked 
to perform experiments to determine the least costly but most efficient 
combination of gases lethal to humans--an objective, value-free 
scientific question in a sense, but a request which few, in hindsight 
at least, would agree to honor? 
This last question is but a variation on the Faustian quandry: 
should one compromise with evil, and, if so, how far? While I am 
not pretentious enough to hazard a general answer, I do have some 
observations. First, the learned alchemist's dilemma was one-sided. 
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It wasn't the Lord, but the Devil who offered him fame and fortune in 
exchange for his soul. Presumably, if the proposition had originated 
in the upper, instead of in the nether regions, the good doctor would 
have had no second thoughts. Likewise, an expert who bears witness 
truthfully and for the side he or she favors as a citizen does not, on 
this count, jeopard his or her virtue. Second, to the extent that 
scholarship, however intended, is ever usable, either as a direct 
influence on current policy or by providing a general background, a 
context, a part of the learning experience of the makers of present or 
future policy, the dilemma is inescapable. The scholar publishes, and, 
having done so, loses control over the uses to which his or her 
material can be put. 
Let me illustrate this last point with a personal anecdote. For a 
congeries of empirical and value-laden reasons, I favor abolition of 
the electoral college. An age-old question, it was debated seriously 
and actually voted on by the U.S. Senate in July, 1979. In an 
extension of remarks section of the Congressional Record which dates 
from that time, I had the honor, if that is the proper phrase, to be 
cited a dozen times in a report prepared by the Congressional Research 
Service which was inserted into the record by a senator. This was the 
first time that my name appeared in the Congressional Record, and it 
may well be the last. Although I am not a daily devotee of that 
publication, a friend who noticed it was kind enough to send it to me. 
The trouble was, I was cited to support the case against abolishing the 
electoral college, and, as if to heap on the insults, the senator who 
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requested the study and had it put into the Record was one whose 
actions rarely fail to outrage me, Orrin Hatch. To top it off, shortly 
after I had posted a response to a sympathetic senator, in which I 
tried to show that my work and other evidence, while cited correctly, 
had been employed superficially, and that a deeper analysis of 
nineteenth and twentieth century southern voting patterns really 
supported the case for abolition, rather than the converse, I learned 
that the vote on the electoral college had just taken place, and that 
my small contribution could no longer even add a historical grace note 
to the debate. Although I had hatched no Faustian bargain, and gained 
neither glory nor remuneration from this epidode of scholarly 
"influence" on public policy, my words had done the Devil's work just 
as surely. 
The process by which a fundamentally honest expert witness arrives at 
conclusions, I have tried to argue, differs less from that which honest 
scholars employ in their everyday work than is sometimes charged. 
Insofar as they do diverge, moreover, it is by no means clear that the 
normal procedures guarantee more objective results than those a witness 
uses. Warren Miller's statement about the different motivations 
involved in trying to "do good" and to "find out how things work," 
quoted at the beginning of this paper, is not in accord with my 
experience. For, potential assualts on a scholar's objectivity are possible 
anywhere. Social scientists' virtue is no more at stake as they walk 
down the dark alleys of policy relevance than it is on the brightly-lit 
streets of the campus. Further, if, instead of confining themselves 
closely in their Ivory Towers, they broadcast their thoughts, like 
paper airplanes, down into the popular mists, they can no longer 
control whether their fragile crafts are wafted on winds of change or 
on counter-currents of reaction. 
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Let me close by considering the implications of these observations 
for lawyers, judges, and historians. For legal professionals, the 
conclusion is that social scientists should be approached neither as 
virgins nor as members of that other ancient profession. If lawyers 
and judges deserve deference in their areas of expertise, so do 
historians and other social scientists in their fields. The major 
aspects of the process of developing and giving testimony which might 
adversely affect the validity of the witnesses' judgments are the 
quality of counsel and the witnesses' expectations about that quality. 
In a word, testifying and scholaring are each about equally objective 
pursuits. 
As for Lee Benson's proposal for an association of progressive 
scholars, it seems to me wrong-headed on three counts. First, such a 
project might well destroy its influence entirely by immediately 
establishing a reputation for bias. It thereby risks being ignored--a 
scholar's most profound nightmare and a consummation which would 
undermine the group's attempts to change either social science or the 
world. Second, to the extent that membership in the group segregated 
its participants, isolated them psychologically from the normal 
processes of criticism, then unless they somehow substituted another 
process for guarding against the hazards of zeal, such as the adversary 
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system, the group's reputation for a lack of objectivity would probably 
be deserved. Third, even if they weren't ignored, their example would 
probably stimulate a conservative counter-thrust, which would no doubt 
be better funded and would probably gain a better press. If the nee-
Nazi Council for Historical Revision can find an angel willing to 
finance the sending of a lengthy, glossy booklet of whole-cloth 
fabrications to the entire Organization of American Historians' mailing 
list, how much more could a relatively reputable reactionary group 
raise! Even if Benson's new synthesis takes place, then, it is likely 
to be followed, Hegel fashion, by its antithesis, and the final product 
of the two, it seems probable to me, will indeed be a changed social 
science--for the worse--but one which has lost all promise of changing 
the world. 
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